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In The Supreme Court
Of The State of Utah

DORA H. STEVENS, CONNIE JOY
LEIGH, JACK HOLT STEVENS and
ALICE DAYLE ESPLIN,
Plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
\

COLORADO FUEL & IRON, a corp- /
oration, for whom UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION has been substituted, and EMPLOYERS MUTUALS OF WAUSAU, a corporation,

Case
No. 11808

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case calls for a review of a memorandum decision of the Honorable C. Nelson Day. District Judge
of the Fifth Judicial District of Utah on a case arising
out of the District Court of Iron County, Utah, said memorandum decision being dated the 26th day of July, 1969,
filed by the Clerk on the 29th of July, 1969. This matter
arose on a motion to dismiss and motion to strike off
the defendant United States Steel Corporation, dated
the 26th day of August, 1966, argued thereafter and taken under advisement for a considerable period of time
thereafter. The motion to strike was not acted upon.
The memoraudum decision granted the motion to dis-
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miss, in effect saying that the amended complaint of
the plaintiffs should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be had.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was originally filed naming Colorado
Fuel & Iron, a corporation, and Employers Mutuals of
Wausau, a corporation, defendants, upon a mistaken
concept of the factual situation pertaining to the death
of one Albert W. Stevens who died as an employee of
Utah Construction & Mining Company out of an accident that occurred on the 19th day of August, 1964,
the death occurring the 21st day of August, 1964.
This original complaint was filed upon a theory that
Utah Construction Company was an operating Company for Colorado Fuel & Iron, and Colorado Fuel
& Iron had failed to make the place safe for the employees of Utah Construction Company. Employers Mutuals
of Wausau, a corporation, was joined, inasmuch as a
maximum award had been made by the Utah State Industrial Commission on the death, and Employers Mutuals of Wausau was and is paying periodic payments on
the death of Albert W. Stevens based upon this finding.
Upon being apprised and ascertaining that the death
actually occurred on a different operation from the original concept, plaintiffs filed a motion to substitute
United States Steel Corporation for Colorado Fuel &
Iron. This substitution was allowed by the court. Also
an amended complaint was filed by permission of the
court. A motion to dismiss of Employers Mutuals of
Wausau was denied and said defendant was given twenty days to answer. Said defendant was so noticed on
the 17th day of December, 1965, but no answer for said
defendant has been filed to date. Although the default
has never been entered, Employers Mutuals of Wausau
is in default.
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When it was ascertained that the plaintiffs' original concept of the operation on which the death occurred was erroneous, the Honorable C. Nelson Day granted a motion to file an amended complaint and motion
for substitution of parties, allowing United States Steel
Corporation to be substituted as defendant for Colorado
Fuel & Iron, a orporation, and a voluntary dismissal
as against Colorado Fuel & Iron was effected. Service
was obtained on United States Steel Corporation who
made an entry of appearance in the due course of events.
The primary change in the amended complaint, in addition to changing the parties, was moving the site of the
accident to the place where the accident that caused
the death actually occurred. Albert W. Stevens, before
his death, had been shifted to an operation of Utah Construction Company in connection with Colorado Fuel &
Iron, in which Utah Construction was an operating company for Colorado Fuel & Iron , and the morning on
which the accident occurred from which he died, Albert
W. Stevens was shifted back to the operation conducted
by Utah Construction Company either as an operator
or as a tenant of United States Steel Corporation. The
motion to dismiss of United States Steel Corporation
filed in 1966 was granted in 1969.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-appellants seek to have the Supreme
Court review the trial court's action in allowing the
motion to dismiss the amended complaint as served
against United States Steel Corporation, and to have
the act of dismissal set aside and the defendant United
States Steel Corporation required to answer, and the
matter go to a jury trial.

""""'
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs-appellants are the widow and the
heirs at law of the late Albert W. Stevens, deceased. The
plaintiff, Dora H. Stevens, in addition to being a wodow, is a dependent of said Albert W. Stevens, deceased.
Long prior to the death of Albert W. Stevens, a subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation, to-wit, Columbia Iron Mining Company, owned and operated mining
claims on the Lindsay Hill in the Iron Springs Mining
District in Iron County, Utah. On or about the 13th day
of December, J 963, said corporation merged with United
States Steel Corporation, and at the time complained of,
these claims were the property of United States Steel
Corporation. Some of the records of Iron County have
not been changed to show this merger, but since the
13th day of December, 1963, all claims in the Lindsay
Hill area of the Iron Springs Mining District that were
formerly owned by the Columbia Iron Mining Company
have actually been owned by the United States Steel
Corporation. This was the condition on or about the 19th
day of August, 1964, to and including the 21st day of
August, 1964.
On or about the 31st day of December, 1949, the
Coluumbia Iron Mining Company and Utah Construction & Mining Company entered into a document called
an operating agreement by the terms of which Columbia Iron Mining Company attempted to sell said Utah
Construction & Mining Company ore in the area on said
Lindsay Hill known as the Lindsay, Wanderer, Little
Allie, Belgium and Cora No. 1 Lode Mining Claims, under the terms of which said agreement said ore could be
removed and stockpiled and later sold. There was no
obligation to pay for said ore until it was sold, and nothing was paid upon removal. There was a specific provision that any ore sold to Columbia Iron Mining Company
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would be sold without a royalty having been paid on
same, and Utah Construction & Mining Companv was
paid for removing the ore under these conditio.ns by
some method not set forth in the agreement. Columbia
Iron Mining Company was the primary purchaser and
purchased in excess of 95< of all ore so removed, and
as a matter of practice, this amounted to an operation
agreement whereby Utah Construction was paid for the
removal of ore by Columbia Iron Mining Company. No
co-mingling of ore was allowed in the stockpiles, even
though stockpiled on property of Utah Construction &
l\IIining Company, and only at the time of shipment was
any co-mingling allowed. Also, the only time there was
any payment to be due to Columbia Iron Mining Company from Utah Construction was in the event ore was
sold to any other party in accordance with the royalty
provisions. As a matter of practical fact, United States
::;tee! Corporation was the only purchaser of the oi...
from these mining claims under said agreement, and
as a matter of practical operation, said agreement was
nothing but an agreement for the removal of ore, the
property of Columbia Iron Mining Company, by Utah
Construction Company. The reason for said agreement
is immaterial as far as this suit is concerned.
1(

In 1961, this agreement was modified, but in no
way changed the principal agreement. Although said
agreement contained a provision for the payment of
royalty, as a matter of fact this provision was not
effective until the iron ore was actually sold to someone else, and in the event the ultimate consumer was
Columbia Iron Mining Company, there was never any
amount paid under the royalty provisions of the agreement.
At the time of the merger, on or about the 13th
day of December, 1963, United States Steel Corporation,
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the defendant, took over the position of Columbia Iron
Mining Company, and under those conditions became a
party to those agreement directly. Since that time United
States Steel Corporation has been the only purchaser of
said mined ores under said agreement, and Utah Construction & Mining Company has never paid any royalty under the terms of said agreement. As a matter of
practical effect, this agreement is nothing but an operation agreement by the terms of which the Utah Construction and Mining Company operated the area in
question for United States Steel Corporation.
Albert W. Stevens, deceased, had worked for Utah
Construction Company long prior to the merger. During the two weeks prior to the 19th of August, 1964, Albert W. Stevens had not been working in this particular
area, but had been working in a different area for a
different crew, still in the employment of Utah Construction & Mining Company. This was on the Colorado
Fuel & Iron operation. On the morning of the 19th of
August, 1964, Albert W. Stevens returned to the crew
he had been \Vorking with, and was instructed to dump
low-grade ore from the claims of United States Steel
on low-grade stockpile No. 8. While he had been away
from the crew, the end of this stockpile had been undermined. and there was a precipitous face on same
approximately 80 feet in height. There were no safety
provisions whatsoever for the dumping by trucks. The
truck operated by Mr. Stevens had a gross weight of
approximately 110 tons, and carried approximately 70
tons of ore. Normal procedure was to back this truck
to the edge and hoist same, dumping the ore over the
edge of the stockpile. On a normal slope, this was normally a safe operation. However, on a precipitous slope,
this placed the entire weight of the truck on the two
rear wheels within a few inches of the edge of the precipitous slopp which had been undermined during the
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absence of Mr. Stevens, and of \vhich he had no knowledge, and on which there were no safety precautions
taken whatsoever. The bank gave way and the truck
cartwheeled down the slopP with the cab being on the
outside of the cartwheel, and Mr. Stevens landed on
his head on the roof of the steel cab. He died from his
injuries two days later. This particular pile of lowgrade ore was the exclusive property of United States
Steel Corporation under the provisions of the so-called
operating agreement, and the pile contained no ore
except that removed from claims of United States Steel
Corporation. The ore had not been paid for under any
operating or lease agreement by Utah Construction
Company at the time of said accident, and there was
no duty to pay for same until it was removed from said
stockpile, even if sold to another party. As of the 19th
day of August, 1964, no flags or warning of any kind
were put into effect by either United States Steel Corporation or Utah Construction & Mining Company, or
any person or persons working for either company as
to the dangerous condition of the east end of said lowgrade ore stockpile No. 8. No inspections had been made
of same whatsoever by either United States Steel Corporation or Utah Construction & Mining Company. Had
inspections been made on a regular basis this condition would have been ascertained, and had it been ascertained, reasonable steps should have been taken for
the safety of operating personnel.
At the time of his death, Albert W. Stevens had
been steadily employed as a truck driver by Utah Construction & Mining Company for several years, and on
said date was approximately 54 years of age, and was
steadily employed at a wage scale of $3.285Vt per hour,
working eight hours per day for five days a week. He
was not at any time advised that said low-grade stockpile No. 8 was in any other than a normal condition, or
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that a precipitous condition had been created on the
east end thereof. Only one load of ore had been dumped on this day previous to Mr. Steven's first trip there,
and this ore was not dumped over the precipitous end.
At the time of the injury which resulted in the death
of Mr. Stevens. qualified engineers and safety personnel
were available to United States Steel Corporation on a
permanent basis, ':vithin a few miles of said low-grade
stockpile on which said accident occurred that caused
his death, had said defendant, United States Steel Corporation seen fit to inquire as to the conditions under
which these men worked.
The purpose of maintaining said low-grade stockpiles No. 8 was exclusively for removing the ore from
same to answer ore requirements of United States Steel
Corporation, and said stockpile was used exclusively
to store ore removed from the claims of United States
Steel Corporation. Said ore was being held in said stockpile for the exclusive benefit of United State Steel
Corporation as a matter of practical effect. The removal
of said ore was controlled by the ore requirements of
United States Steel Corporation, and this ore, at the
time of the injury and death of Albert W. Stevens, was
one of the primary sources of ore for the Geneva works
of United States Steel Corporation. At no time were
safety inspections made by United States Steel Corportion. United States Steel Corporation, as owner of said
ore had a duty to inspect to see that all employees were
working under safe conditions. This duty applied to employees of contractors as well as employees of United
States Steel Corporation. United States Steel Corporation did not perform this duty at all.
Almost immediately after the truck driven by said
Albert W. Stevens, deceased, toppled over the precipitous edge of the stockpile, material was caused to be

dumped as a balTicade several yards \\·est of said precipitous edge, so that it would be impossible for another
vehicle to approach said edge, but this action of barricading was not a normal precaution and was not done
on other 10\v-grade stockpiles or waste piles that did
not have a precipitous edge as did lo\\ -grade stockpile
No. 8.
On or· about the 1st day of October, 1964, the Industrial Commission of Utah made an order requiring
the defendant Employers Mutuals of Wausau to pay to
the plaintiff, Dora H. Stevens, as dependent wife of
said Albert W. Stevens, the sum of $12,002.00 in payments of $42.85 per week, commencing the 19th day
of August, 1964, and continuing for 280-117 weeks. By
the provisions of Title 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated
1953, and amendments thereto, said defendant, Employers Mutuals of Wausau, is subrogated to the rights
of the plaintiff for the amounts it has actually paid under said award.
Said agreement bet\veen Columbia Iron Mining
Company and Utah Construction & Mining Company
has not been revised since the merger The price paid
per ton by United States Steel Corporation has not been
comr.iensurate with the market price of ore of the same
quality at the time of delivery, and the practical effect
of said agreement is that it is an operating agreement
for the mining of iron ore by Utah Construction & Mining Company as an agent of United States Steel Corporation. At all times, said mining and stockpiling has
been controlled by the dictates of the Geneva works of
United States Steel
and at all times the
ore in said stockpile No. 8 has been thP property of
United States Steel Corporation and has been kept in
existence and segregated as such primarily for the use
and benefit of United States Steel Corporation at its
Geneva Works.
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION OF 26 AUGUST 1969.
It is quite apparent that the trial court erred in
this matter. Finding No. 6 shows that plaintiffs' attorney
entirely failed to make the trial court even remotely
aware of the position of the plaintiffs. This finding
states, "The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that
the said decedent Stevens was not in the category of
and employee of the United States Steel Corporation.
All of the Utah cases appear to base the test of employer-employee relationship on the right of supervision
and control. In this case there appeared to be none
whatever."

This can only show the entire failure of the trial
court to grasp the situation that the plaintiffs were
faced with. At no place in any pleading, memorandum,
or any other item, was the statement ever made that
the decedent was an employee of United States Steel
Corporation. The entire effort of the plaintiffs had been
on the basis that United States Steel Corporation was
a third person \\,'ith a duty to make the entire area safe
for the employees of its contractors under the provisions of Title 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and
amendments thereto. The test the trial court applied,
and upon which it based its decision, was an employeeemployer relationship.
The trial court entirely failed to make any finding
whatsoever as to whether or not United States Steel
was a third party under the provisions of Title 35-1-62,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Although this was mentioned in Paragraph 5 of the memorandum decision as
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the contention of the plaintffs, there is nu finding whatsoever on this point. Cntil there is a finding on this
point, this mat1er is not settled.
The other part of ddendant's motion for dismissal
which apparently b not aC'ted upon by the court, is that
workmen's compensation a\\ ard is a bar to recoverey by
the plaintiffs from the defendant. This is specifically
contrary to the provision of Title 33-1-62, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. Cast>s are legion that the only person
\\'ho is protected under this provision is the employer,
l 1tah Construction Company, and may be found in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. 107 Utah 114, 152 P2d 98,
and various other items, and 101 Utah :n9. which denies a rehearing on this case. This Johanson v. Cudahy
Packing Company decision was approved and followed
by the Federal Courts in Jay v. Chicago Brides and Iron
Co. 150 Fed 2d 247.
The pleadings specifically alleged the death of Albert W. Stevens, deceased, to be as a result of United
States Steel Corporation's failure to perform certain
acts it had a duty to perform. The theory in the case of
Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295 117 P 54. 37. which sets
out the basis of justifying a recovery of exemplary damages to the effect that the act
the injury must
be done with an evil intent, has now been refined to a
question of "Positive misconduct manifesting a conscious disregard of the rights of others and reckless indifference to consequences." This is set forth in Wilson
v. Oldroyd, J Utah 2d 362, 267 P:2d 730. This is also affirmed in the case of Calhoun v. Uni\'ersal Credit Company, 106 Utah 166, 146 P2d 284. This has even bePn carried to the rendition of damages in a "Uit for trespass
by horses. Punitive damages were upheld and allowed
by the trial court and the Supreme Court of Utah in the
case of Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 1:"i2, 379 P2d 380,
on the basis "Defendant's wrong persisted with an in-
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difference to the consequences and to plaintiff's rights."
Certainly under the case at bar, we have a corn.
plete indifference to the consequences by failure to
make an inspection and to make the place safe for a
man to work and to handle this tremendously heavy
machinery. Certainly, creating a trap of this nature,
where a precipitous bank is made 80 feet high without
support, with ore to be dumped over the end of it by
trucks weighing in excess of 100 tons, in which the dump
mechanism places all the weight on the back, demonstrates a callous and indifferent attitude for the safety
of employees, and demonstrates an indifference to the
consequences and to the rights of an employee. Certainly this is a reckless desregard of the rights of an individual, and evidences a wrongful motive as well as intent of indifference to the consequences.
The right to sue someone besides an employer for
an item of this nature, where there is a duty on other
people to make places safe for employment, is set forth
in Johnson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P2d 98, 107 Utah
114. This case and the cases following it are leading
cases to the effect that third parties may be sued under
these conditions, regardless of the Workmens Compensation Act. In the case of Rogalski v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P2d 304, plaintiff was cleaning
an employer's truck, who was a distributee of defend·
ant, cleaning being on the premises of the defendant.
Plaintiff fell off the ramp into a vat of caustic soda.
Employer was covered by the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and compensation was paid thereunder. In this
case, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the action
could be maintained against the third party, regardless
of the compensation, and that although the compensa·
tion carrier had a right of action against the defendant, same was not exclusive, with the following state-
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rnent, "The duty owed by an owner of land to a business visitor is to inspect and maintain his premises in a
reasonably safe condition or to warn the visitor of any
dengcrous conditions existing thereon.''
This is exactly the same situation we have in the
case at bar: Ore owned by United State Steel was put
in a stockpile. At no time was there every any safety inspection. For this fact, see the deposition of Clayton S.
Lewis, Page 9, Line 25, to Page 11, Line 12. and Page 20,
Line 6, to Page 21, Line 26. There was never any check
by the United States Steel Corporation. Sec the deposition
of Clayton S. Lewis, Page '.21, Line 13, to Page 21, Line
'.26, and if there is any question concerning the ownership of the ore, see the statements in the depositions
concerning the ore being stockpiled according to ownership and the claims it came from: The deposition of York
Jones, Page 18, Line 24, to Page 19, Line 29; the deposition of Clayton S. Lewis, Page 3, Line 20, to Page 6, Line
7, and Page 8, Line 16 to Page 9, Line 24; the deposition
of Morton E. Pratt concerning co-mingling of ores not
being done in the low-grade stockpiles. and piles being
kept separate based upon the claims they came from,
Page J2, Line 19, to Page 13, Line 12, and Page 15, Line
12, to Page J 7, Line 6.
Concerning the general operation of the stockpile,
see the deposition of York Jones, Page 14, Line 2, to Page
15, Line 12, and the deposition of Morton E. Pratt, Page
5, Line 22, to Page 10, Line 3. Concerning the sales of the
ore and co-mingling at that point, see the deposition of
Morton E. Pratt, Page 11, Line 8, to Page 12, Line 10.
Pertaining to whether or not there was any assumption of risk by the deceased which to point date has not
been raised, see the case of
v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d
upon the trier of facts the
79, 262 P2d 285, which
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presumption that the decendent used due care for his
own safety in the absence of a prima facie showing to
the contrary.
Also,, see the case of Evans v. Sturart, 17 Utah 2d
308, 410, P2d 999.
CONCLUSION
Under these conditions, it can be clearly seen that
plaintiffs' counsel entirely failed to make the trial court
aware of plaintiffs' theory of the case, and the circumstances that brought same about; even though finding
No. 5 is in contention that defendant failed in its duty of
inspection and were in fact grossly negligent which proximately caused or contributed to Mr. Stevens' death, and
that therefore recovery may be had under the provisions
of Title 35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953, on the question of a third person the trial court failed to make any
finding whatsoever on this particular point, but went off
on a question of employee-employer relationship.
Under these conditions there can be no question except that the trial court's memorandum decision is in er·
ror, and that this matter should be reversed, and an Iron
County jury allowed to assess damages in connection
with the death of Albert \V. Stevens.
RELIEF DESIRED
Plaintiffs desire that the memorandum decision be
reversed; that the defendant United States Steel Corporation be given a reasonable time to answer, and that
thereafter the matter be set for trial before an Iron
County jury for findings and assessment of damages in
accordance with the law.
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Respectfully submitted.
PATRICK H. FEI\TOI\
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
13 'Nest Hoover A\enue
Cedar City, Utah 84720

